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the jurors followed the trial court's proper instructions and second, that
the instructions sufficiently impressed upon the jury the importance of its
role. Accordingly, the majority reasoned that the evidence should have
had little to no effect on the jury's deliberations. 22 By refusing to address
the potential effects of the Thompson death sentence on the jury, the
majority effectively shifted to Romano the burden of proving that this
evidence infected the jury's deliberations to an unconstitutional de-
gree.23 Although a subtie shift, the results were nevertheless damning to
the defendant while according a windfall to the state.24 In Caldwell the
Court overturned a capital sentence as unreliable because of the unknown
impact of a prosecutor's closing statements on the jury's sense of
responsibility. Unable to say whether or not the evidence influenced the
jury inRomano, the majority refused to engage the issue any further and
upheld the conviction thereby signaling satisfaction with the reliability
of the jury's discharge of its duties.
Although Romano has no direct impact on Virginia practice, it does
illustrate the effects of state evidentiary rules on capital deliberations.
Not only does the decision call into question the amount of attention paid
by the Court to these effects, but it also casts doubt upon the court's
commitment to the reliability of capital jury determinations. Admittedly,
22 Romano v. Oklahoma, 114 S. Ct. at 2012. Interestingly, in
arriving at this conclusion, the court altogether ignored the fact that the
instructions explicitly limited the jury's consideration to the four
aggravators Oklahoma sought to prove and that the Thompson sentence
was the sole support for the past dangerousness aggravator.
23 Id. at 2016. In dissent, Justice Blackmun pointed out that
Caldwell did not require Romano to prove the prosecutor's belief that
introduction of the death sentence would incline the jury towards death.
24 Compare with Lockhart v. Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. 838 (1993).
Romano approved the state's use of a conviction and sentence that were
accurate at the time of trial. The later reversal of the conviction and
sentence was not held to render their use a "windfall" for the state. In
contrast, defense counsel's failure in Lockhart to cite to the sentencing
the Eighth Amendment does not establish a federal code of evidence to
supersede state evidence rules in capital sentencing proceedings;
25
however, the Court's stance in -Green v. Georgia26 implies that state
evidentiary rules must sometimes give way in capital sentencing pro-
ceedings. 27 It is unclear whether Romano signals a trend toward
increased deference to states in this area at the expense of reliability.
Romano demonstrates the importance of making every effort to
prevent the admission of irrelevant evidence into capital sentencing
proceedings. Even though a defendant's prior capital conviction may be
relevant to issues of past and future dangerousness, evidence of the
imposition of the death penalty by one jury is irrelevant to the capital
sentencing determinations of another jury. It is therefore critical for
defense attorneys to attempt to block admission of such evidence through
motions in limine and timely objections. It is true that Romano eventu-
ally lost his claim five to four in the United States Supreme Court.
However, had the claim been defaulted, as are so many constitutional
claims in Virginia, it would never have received federal review.
Summary and analysis by:
Jody M. Bieber
court a case, valid at that time, that would have prevented his client from
being sentenced to death constituted ineffective assistance. However,
since the case was later reversed, the United States Supreme Court found
Fretwell did not suffer any prejudice at the hands of his counsel and to
therefore allow his ineffective assistance of counsel claim to succeed
would amount to a "windfall."
25 Romano v. Oklahoma, 114 S. Ct. at 2011.
26 442 U.S. 95 (1979).
27 Id. (holding that the exclusion of testimonial evidence suggesting
co-defendant was the triggerman was grounds for reversal even though
the evidence violated the hearsay rule provided by Georgia's rules of
evidence).
TURNER v. WILLIAMS
35 F.3d 872 (4th Cir. 1994)
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
FACTS
On the morning of July 12, 1978, Willie Lloyd Turner, armed with
a shotgun, entered ajewelry store owned and operated by W. Jack Smith,
Jr. In the course of robbing the store, Turner, without any provocation,
shot Smith in the head. After a police officer had attempted to negotiate
with him, Turner returned to Smith and fired two close-range shots into
the left side of Smith's chest. Although Smith had survived the initial
wound, these second shots were fatal.1
I Turner v. Williams, 35 F.3d 872, 876-877 (4th Cir. 1994).
2 Id. at 877.
3 Turner v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 513, 273 S.E.2d 36 (1980),
cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1011 (1981).
Turner was convicted and sentenced to death2 and the Virginia
Supreme Court, on direct appeal, affirmed.3 Turner then filed a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus in Virginia, which was denied.4 Turner next
filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, which was also denied.
5
Turner was granted certiorari by the United States Supreme Court, which
4 Turner v. Williams, 35 F.3d at 877. The Supreme Court of
Virginia affirmed and the United States Supreme Court again denied
certiorari. Turner v. Morris, 462 U.S. 1112 (1983).
5 Turner v. Williams, 35 F.3d at 877. This was affirmed by the Court
of Appeals. Turner v. Bass, 753 F.2d 342 (4th Cir. 1985).
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vacated his sentence and remanded the case so that a new sentencing
hearing could be held.
6
At the this sentencing hearing, the jury again returned a verdict
fixing Turner's sentence at death based solely on the "vileness" factor.
This sentence was upheld on direct appeal. Turner's petitions for writ
of habeas corpus to the Virginia Court or Appeals 8 and to the United
States District Court of the Eastern District of Virginia 9 were both
dismissed. Turner appealed this dismissal to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
HOLDING
The Court of Appeals held that the claims made by Turner did not
seek the benefit of a new rule for the purposes of Teague v. Lane,10 thus
the court could reach the merits of Turner's claims. 11 The court
determined that Turner's claim that the jury instructions inadequately
defined the statutory "vileness" aggravating factor was without merit and




Before the Court of Appeals could determine the merits of Turner's
claims, it had to determine whether these claims were barred under the
doctrine of Teague v. Lane. In Teague, a plurality of the Supreme Court
adopted a nonretroactivity approach which held that if granting peti-
tioner relief would establish a "new" constitutional rule and place an
obligation on the state courts that could not have been reasonably
anticipated at the time of the petitioner's trial and direct appeal, federal
courts should ordinarily decline to decide the issue raised by the peti-
tioner. 13 The doctrine provides for two narrowly drawn exceptions.
14
When determining whether habeas relief should be granted, a federal
court should take three steps in determining whether Teague should
apply.15 This three-pronged test requires the court to determine the date
that the defendant's conviction and sentence became final, then to
determine the state of the law at that time.16 If the state court should have
determined, according to then existing precedent, that the rule the
6 Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28 (1986) (sentence vacated because
trial court had refused to question prospective jurors about possible bias
resulting from the fact that Turner was African American and his victim
was white).
7 Turner v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 543, 364 S.E.2d 483, cert.
denied, 486 U.S. 1017 (1988).
8 Turner v. Williams, No. 901335 (Va. App. 30, 1991).
9 Turner v. Williams, 812 F. Supp. 1400 (E.D. Va. 1993).
10 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
11 Turner v. Williams, 35 F.3d at 887.
12 Turner also made several claims concerning ineffective assis-
tance of counsel which will not be addressed in this summary.
13 489 U.S. at 299-316.
14 The first exception is for "certain kinds of primary, private
individual conductbeyond thepower of the criminal law-making author-
ity to proscribe." Teague, 489 U:S. at 311. The second exception is for
"watershed rules of criminal procedure implicating the fundamental
fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding." Saffle v. Parks, 494
U.S. 484,495 (1990).
15 Caspari v. Bohlen, 114 S. Ct. 948, 953 (1993).
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id. For further discussion of the applicability of the Teague
doctrine, see Pohl & Turner, If at First You Don'tSucceed: The Real and
defendant sought was required by the Constitution, then it is not new and
not barred by Teague.17 If the defendant is seeking a new rule, then the
court must determine whether the new rule would fall within one of the
two exceptions to the nonretroactivity principle of Teague.18
The Virginia "vileness" aggravating factor allows a jury to impose
a sentence of death if the jury finds that the defendant's conduct in
committing the offense was "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or
inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind or an aggravated
battery to the victim."19 AtTurner's trial, the jury was instructed that "an
aggravated battery is a battery which qualitatively and quantitatively is
more culpable than the minimum necessary to accomplish an act of
murder."'20 The jury was also instructed that "depravity of mind is a
degree of moral turpitude and and [sic] psychical debasement surpassing
that inherent in the definition of ordinary legal malice and premedita-
tion."21
The court applied the three-pronged approach formulated in Teague
to Turner's claim that Virginia's "vileness" aggravating factor and its
limiting constructions were unconstitutionally applied in his case. First,
the court determined that Turner's conviction and sentence became final
in 1988.22 Turner based his claim on the plurality opinion in Godfrey v.
Georgia,2 3 which was decided eight years before Turner's conviction
became final. 24 Godfrey had established that statutory language identi-
cal to Virginia's vileness factor was unconstitutionally vague and that the
jury must be given limiting instructions to cure this vagueness, because
theEighth Amendmentrequires that the state "mustchannel the sentencer's
discretion by clear and objective standards that provide specific and
detailed guidance, and that make rationally reviewable the process for
imposing a sentence of death."'25 Thus if a limiting construction is itself
too vague to remedy the vagueness of the aggravating factor, then it
"would fail adequately to channel the sentencing decision ....26
Godfrey was thus the basis for Turner's claim that the limiting
constructions given in his case did not remedy the vagueness of the
"vileness" aggravator. Since Godfrey had been decided prior to Turner's
conviction and sentence being final, a majority of the Fourth Circuit
panel held thatTurner did not seek to rely on anew rule and that his claims
were not barred under Teague v. Lane.27
Potential Impact of Simmons v. South Carolina in Virginia, section IV,
Capital Defense Digest, this issue.
19 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.2 (1990).
20 Turner, 35 F.3d at 891.
21 Id. at 880. Both of these limiting constructions were formulated
by the court in Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455, 248 S.E.2d 135
(1978). Although these definitions have been formulated in an attempt
to cure the vagueness of the statutory definition of the "vileness"
aggravating factor, the Supreme Court of Virginia has not required that
these limiting constructions be given. Clarkv. Commonwealth, 220 Va.
201,257 S.E.2d 784(1979). Even after the United States Supreme Court
decided in Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980), that the statutory
language was unconstitutionally vague, the Virginia Supreme Court later
reaffirmed Clark and did not mandate the use of any limiting construc-
tions. Tuggle v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 493,323 S.E.2d 539 (1984).
22 Turner v. Williams, 35 F.3d at 880.
23 466 U.S. 420 (1980) (plurality opinion).
24 Turner, 35 F.3d at 880.
25 Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 428.
26 Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 428 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 195 n.46 (1976)).
27 Turner, 35 F.3d at 887. This holding would appear to be correct
since the United States Supreme Court had also held that later claims
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The court nextdetermined thatTumer's claims were notprocedurally
defaulted, as argued by the Commonwealth.2 8 In his brief on direct
appeal, Turner had claimed that the Virginia Supreme Court "must adopt
stricter standards for defining and applying the vileness aggravating
circumstance." 29 Turner had also suggested changes for the limiting
constructions of the vileness aggravator:
This Court should make clear that an aggravated battery must
be one which, qualitatively and quantitatively, is much more
vile than the minimum necessary to accomplish the act of
murder, and that "depravity of mind" is a degree of moral
turpitude and psychical debasement that far surpasses that
inherent in the definition of legal malice and premeditation.
30
The highlighted portions were the only additions suggested by
Turner. He claimed that without these additions, the limiting construc-
tions were constitutionally deficient31 because they were "incomprehen-
sible and that they fail[ed] to narrow the class of persons eligible for the
death penalty."
'32
The court disagreed with Turner's assertion, referring to a prior
decision in which it had upheld the same limiting instructions given in
Turner's case.33 The court stated that the limiting instructions given
were "sufficiently clear and objective" and that they "adequately
narrow[ed] the class of persons eligible to receive the death penalty
because a juror of ordinary sensibility would not find that all murders
involve depravity of mind or an aggravated battery. ' 34 This, the court
stated, is accomplished because something extra is required over the
"ordinary" murder, such as force "greater than the minimum necessary
to accomplish an act of murder" or "a degree of psychical debasement
surpassing that inherent in the definition of ordinary legal malice and
premeditation." 35 Finally, the court compared these limiting construc-
tions of the Virginia vileness factor to those approved by the United
States Supreme Court inArave v. Creech,36 where "utter disregard" was
defined as "meant to be reflective of acts or circumstances surrounding
the crime which exhibit the highest, the utmost, callous disregard for
human life, i.e., the cold-blooded, pitiless slayer. ' 37 The court stated that
"[s]urely the limiting construction applied in Turner's case is as clear
and objective as, and satisfies the narrowing requirement as well as, the
construction upheld in Creech."38
based on Godfrey did not seek a new rule for the purposes of Teague. See
Stringer v.Black, 112 S. Ct. 1130 (1992).
28 Turner, 35 F.3d at 891.
29 Id. at 890.
30 Id. (quoting JA 553-554) (emphasis in original).
31 Turnerv. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 543,552 n.2, 364 S.E.2d483,
488 n.2.
32 Turner v. Williams, 35 F.3d at 892.
33 Id. See Jones v. Murray, 976 F.2d 169 (1992) (holding that the
identical limiting instructions were specific and provided adequate
guidance to the jury, thus meeting the requirements of Godfrey).
34 Turner, 35 F.3d at 892.
35 Jones, 976 F.2d at 174-75.
36 113 S. Ct. 1534 (1993). For a detailed analysis of Arave v.
Creech, see case summary ofArave, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 6, No.
1, p. 4 (1993).
37 Id. at 1539. This limiting construction was originally formulated
in State v. Osborn, 631 P.2d 187 (Idaho 1981).
38 Turner, 35 F.3d at 892.
39 Idaho Code § 18-4001-4004 (1987).
40 If certain factors are present, e.g. homicide committed while
These few conclusory statements made by the Court of Appeals
were used to justify the determination that the limiting constructions of
the Virginia "vileness" factor are constitutionally sufficient. However,
the authority on which the court claims to rely does not support its
conclusions.
The Court of Appeals directly compared the language of the
limiting construction approved in Creech to that used for Turner. A
problem with this comparison on the issue of narrowing the death eligible
class by guiding discretion arises when the differences in the capital
murder statutes of Idaho and Virginia are considered. Under themurder
statutes of Idaho,39 all first-degree murderers are eligible for death and
the class of first-degree murderers is broad.40 In Virginia, the class of
murderers eligible for the death penalty is limited to killings that are
"willful, deliberate, and premeditated" and must include a predicate
felony or other circumstance. 41 Thus, meeting the requirement of
Creech that limiting constructions must "genuinely narrow the class of
persons eligible for the death penalty" would be much harder in Virginia
than in Idaho, and the language used in Idaho provides an inadequate
basis for determining what language must be used for such constructions
in Virginia. 42
On the issue of providing some minimal guidance to the jury by the
use of narrowing constructions, Creech actually suggests a result oppo-
site to that reached by the Fourth Circuit panel in Turner. Quoting
Godfrey, the Creech court reaffirmed that the State must not only
"channel the sentencer's discretion by clear and objective standards"'43
but that those standards must "provide specific and detailed guidance,
and make rationally reviewable the process for imposing a sentence of
death." 44 Creech also cited Walton v. Arizona45 as establishing the
inquiry that a federal court must make when determining whether an
aggravating circumstance meets this standard: If the statutory language
is "too vague to provide guidance to the sentencer" the court must
"attempt to determine whether the state courts have further defined the
vague terms and if they have done so, whether those definitions are
constitutionally sufficient, i.e., whether they provide some guidance to
the sentencer."
46
Using this analysis, the Court in Creech determined that the phrase
"cold-blooded, pitiless slayer" described a killer who kills without
feeling or sympathy.47 Though this seemed to require a subjective
serving time for prior murder, what would constitute second-degree
murder in other jurisdictions is elevated to first-degree murder. Idaho
Code § 18-4003 (1987).
41 Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-31 (1990).
42 TheCourtgives furthersupportforthis argument when O'Connor,
J., writing for the majority in Creech, states: "Given the statutory
scheme, however, we believe that a sentencing judge reasonably could
find that not all Idaho capital defendants are 'cold-blooded."' 113 S. Ct.
at 1543 (emphasis added). This statement also points out that Idaho uses
judges for sentencing determinations in capital murder cases. Walton v.
Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990), notes thatjudges are presumed to apply the
states limiting constructions. Since Virginia uses juries for sentencing,
the language is even less reliable as a point of comparison for formulating
Virginia limiting constructions.
43 Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764,774 (1990) (quoting Godfrey, at
446 U.S. at 428) (emphasis added).
44 Id. (emphasis added).
45 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
46 Id. at 654 (emphasis in original).
47 Creech, 113 S. Ct. at 1541.
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analysis, the Court stressed that itreally went to the defendant's "attitude
toward his conduct and his victim,"'48 and thus was an objective determi-
nation that was "ascertainable from the surrounding facts."49 Even more
importantly, the Court determined that the language of this limiting
construction did not rely on "pejorative adjectives such as 'especially
heinous, atrocious, or cruel' or 'outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible
and inhuman'-terms that describe a crime as a whole and that this Court
has held to be unconstitutionally vague." 50 These statements establish
the requirement that a limiting construction, without using pejoratives,
clearly define a specific element or specific conduct within the murder
that the sentencer must find before it may determine that a death sentence
is appropriate. The limiting construction may not address the "crime as
a whole".
Finally, the Court in Creech determined that "it is not enough for an
aggravating circumstance, as construed by the state courts, to be deter-
minate. Our precedents make clear that a State's capital sentencing
scheme also must 'genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the
death penalty.' ' 51 The limiting construction "must provide a principled
basis for doing so," thus "[i]f the sentencer fairly could conclude that an
aggravating circumstance applies to every defendant eligible for the
death penalty, the circumstance is constitutionally infirm."52 Most of the
constitutional infirmities of the aggravating factors and limiting con-
structions identified in the discussion by the Creech majority in fact
describe Virginia law.
The statements made by the Court of Appeals in Turner are not truly
an analysis using Creech as a guideline, but are merely conclusory
statements that the limiting constructions used are not constitutionally
infirm. The use of Creech is only to allow comparison of the limiting
constructions language, which, as shown, is not a valid comparison. It
is unfortunate thattheFourth Circuithas approved these constructions of
the "vileness" aggravator. That leaves the United States Supreme Court
to correct this error, except where differences in the presentation of the
issue or construction take a claim out of the ambit of Turner. However,
since the Fourth Circuit's opinion is conclusory and virtually devoid of
analysis, the constitutionality of these limiting constructions should
continue to be raised, litigated and preserved in the same manner as is
currently done.
53
The first step is to move for a bill of particulars that supplies
aggravating factors on which the state intends to rely, and any applicable
limiting constructions. Denial of this motion is a separate error, not
addressed in Turner, in that the defendant has a due process right to know
pretrial the state's case for death against him, so that he may adequately
be able to defend against it.54 The arguments that arise here are that the
aggravating factors of the Virginia capital murder statute are unconstitu-
tionally vague according to Godfrey v. Georgia,55 vagueness which may
only be remedied by limiting constructions which are constitutionally
sound. Without these limiting constructions, the defendant is also denied
48 Id.
49 Id. at 1542.
50 Id. at 1541.
51 Id. at 1542. (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862,877 (1983).
52 Id.
53 For a comprehensive analysis of litigating the vileness factor in
Virginia, see Lago, Litigating the "Vileness" Factor, Capital Defense
Digest, Vol. 4, No. 1, p. 25 (1991).
54 For discussion of the due process analysis of the vileness factor,
see Pohl & Turner, If at First You Don't Succeed: The Real and Potential
proper notice and opportunity to defend against the factor, which denies
a right guaranteed by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. These issues must be litigated pretrial and preserved through all
levels of trial and appeal.
If the Commonwealth responds to the bill of particulars with the
limiting constructions approved in Turner, the defense has grounds for
a motion that these constructions are themselves too vague to guide
sentencing discretion. The basis of this motion is the analysis set out in
Creech and Shell v. Mississippi.56 The Supreme Court in Shell deter-
mined that the "vileness" factor of the Mississippi capital murder statute,
like its counterpart in Virginia, was unconstitutionally vague, thus
requiring a limiting construction to guide the sentencing discretion of the
jury.57 The limiting construction given by the Mississippi court to the
"especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" aggravating factor defined
"heinous" as "extremely wicked or shockingly evil," "atrocious" as
"outrageously wicked and vile" and"cruel" as "designed to inflict a high
degree of pain with indifference to or an enjoyment of the suffering of
others."'58 The Court unanimously found that there was no meaningful
distinction between this limiting construction and the "vileness" factor
itself and thus a person of ordinary sensibility would still be able to
characterize almost every murder as falling within its limits. 59 Since the
limiting construction did not provide the necessary guidance to the
sentencer, it too was constitutionally infirm.
60
The limiting constructions approved in Turner seem to be much
more analogous to the one disapproved in Shell than the one approved in
Creech. They use pejorative terms and legal terms of art, describe the
murder as a whole, and do not lend themselves to determination by
surrounding circumstances. For these reasons, they do nothing to
distinguish themselves from the deficient language of the statutory
"vileness" aggravating factor itself and therefore fail under the court's
reasoning in Shell.
If these arguments fail, an alternative is to submit a proposed jury
instruction defining the "vileness" factor which provides a more mean-
ingful distinction for the sentencer, such as those that have been applied
in Arizona, Georgia, and the instructions approved recently by the Fourth
Circuit in North Carolina.61 These definitions, though they are question-
able in some respects, have been accepted by courts because the essen-
tially reduce the meaning of the aggravating factor to purposeful inflic-
tion of pain before death, or some more clearly identifiable description
of the slayer's attitude toward their victim. In any event, they are
preferable to the meaningless language of the Smith definitions approved
in Turner. However, providing constitutionally sound limiting construc-
tions for an unconstitutionally vague "vileness" factor is the responsibil-
ity of the Commonwealth and the courts, so this is a tactical decision only
to be attempted when it would clearly benefit a particular defendant.
It is important that these issues be litigated and followed up at every
stage of litigation so that they are not defaulted. Though the original aim
Impact of Simmons v. South Carolina in Virginia, Capital Defense
Digest, this issue; see also Lago, supra note 53, at p. 27.
55 446 U.S. 420 (1980).





61 See, e.g., Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 431 (1980)
("depravity of mind" comprehended "the kind of mental state that led a
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is to do everything possible to assure the defendant the constitutional
rights that are guaranteed at the trial stage, it is equally important that if
they are not granted there that they continually and consistently be
pursued at every level. Though from the decision in Turnerit appears that
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals may be unsympathetic to such
appeals, it is hoped that the full court will rehear this case and reverse this
murderer to torture or commit an aggravated battery before killing a
victim; "torture" and "aggravated battery" required a showing of "physi-
cal abuse"); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990) (a crime is commit-
ted in an especially "cruel" manner when the perpetrator inflicts mental
anguish or physical abuse before the victim's death. A murder is
committed in an especially "depraved" manner when the perpetrator
either relishes the murder, evidencing debasement or perversion, or
shows indifference to the suffering of the victim and evidences a sense
of pleasure in the killing); Huffstetler v. Dixon, 28 F.3d 1209 (4th Cir.
1994):
Was the murder especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel? As to
the circumstance, the burden is upon the State to prove to you
from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the murder
in this case was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. A
person of ordinary sensibility could fairly characterize almost
every murder as especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. Not
every murder is especially so. Before you may find the
existence of this circumstance, the State must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the brutality involved in the murder in
this case exceeds that normally present in any killing. The
panel decision or that this issue will eventually be resolved by the United
States Supreme Court. It is thus crucial to preserve this issue until that
day comes.
62
Summary and analysis by:
Timothy B. Heavner
words "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" mean ex-
tremely or particularly or especially heinous or atrocious or
cruel. Heinous means hateful, odious, and reprehensible, and
it also means extremely wicked or shockingly evil. Atrocious
means marked by or given to extreme wickedness, brutal or
cruel, marked by extreme violence or savagely fierce, outra-
geously wicked or violent. Cruel means designed to inflict a
high degree of pain, utterly indifferent to or enjoyment of the
suffering of others. For you to find this murder to have been
especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, it must have been done
without conscience, pitiless, and so as to be unusually tortious
to [the victim]. That is, in the nature of torture or serious
physical abuse of [the victim] before death.
62 For a fuller discussion of the basis for these arguments in
litigating the "vileness" factor in Virginia, see Lago, supra note 53. For
more complete documentation for each of the steps in litigating the
Virginia limiting constructions, seeDefending a Capital Murder Case in
Virginia, a manual published by the Virginia Capital Case Clearing-
house.
BREARD v. COMMONWEALTH
248 Va. 68, 445 S.E.2d 670 (1994)
Supreme Court of Virginia
FACTS
Ruth Dickie was murdered on February 17, 1992, in her Arling-
ton apartment. Police also found evidence of attempted rape.1 Six
months laterpolice arrested Angel Breard for sexually assaulting Jeanine
Price, also of Arlington. Because of the assaults' similarities, Breard
became a suspect in Dickie's unsolved murder.2 Later Breard was
indicted for attempted rape and capital murder in the commission of rape
or attempted rape.
3
The jury found Breard guilty of capital murder and attempted
rape.4 The jury subsequently sentenced Breard to death on the capital
murder conviction, finding both "vileness" and "future dangerousness."
Breard appealed the attempted rape conviction to the Virginia Court of
1 Breard v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 68, 72-73, 445 S.E.2d 670,
673-74 (1994).
2 Id. at 85, 445 S.E.2d at 680.
Appeals and the capital murder conviction to the Supreme Court of
Virginia. The Court of Appeals affirmed the attempted rape conviction,
and Breard appealed it to the Supreme Court of Virginia as well. Thai
court consolidated both of the appeals with its automatic review ol
Breard's death sentence.5
HOLDING
The Supreme Court of Virginia found no reversible error in the trial
court's judgments and thus affirmed Breard's capital murder convictior
3 Id. at 71,445 S.E.2d at 673.
4 Id.
5 Id. at 72, 445 S.E.2d at 673.
